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Executive Summary
Union leaders have been among the most vocal opponents
of privatizing Social Security.  Their opposition is some-
thing of a mystery, because union workers would be among
those who would gain the most if Social Security were trans-
formed to a system of individually owned, privately invested
accounts.  Because a privatized Social Security system would
provide a higher rate of return, union workers would receive
far greater benefits than they would under the current
Social Security system.  In contrast, traditional Social
Security fixes, such as raising payroll taxes, would severe-
ly harm union workers.  Perhaps more important, privatizing
Social Security would break down traditional barriers be-
tween labor and capital by giving workers a greater opportu-
nity to own wealth-producing investments.  In effect, every
laborer would become a capitalist.
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Introduction
Union leaders have been among the most vocal opponents
of privatizing Social Security.  Their opposition is some-
thing of a mystery, because union workers would be among
those who would gain the most if Social security were trans-
formed to a system of individually owned, privately invested
accounts.
The irony is that union bosses have become the last
die-hard defenders of Social Security, because unions were
among the program's original opponents.  In fact, Samuel
Gompers, the father of the American labor movement, called
the concept of government-provided social insurance, "in its
essence undemocratic." 1  More important, by opposing pri vat-
ization and supporting such traditional Social Security
fixes as tax increases and benefit cuts, union leaders are
sacrificing the best interests of American workers.
A privatized Social Security system, in which workers
are allowed to divert their payroll taxes to individually
owned, privately invested accounts, similar to individual
retirement accounts (IRA) or 401(k) plans, would provide
workers with better and more secur retirement benefits,
would give them a greater voice in corporate management and
a sense of ownership and participation in the American
economy, and would avoid painful tax hikes or an increase in
the retirement age.
Better Retirement Benefits
The average union worker earns approximately $33,200 a
year. 2   If that worker is 35 years old, upon retirement at
age 67, Social Security promises to pay the worker $1,559 a
month.  That, however, is only a promise.  Social Security
currently cannot pay for between one-quarter and one-third
of the benefits that have been promised.  Nevertheless,
assuming that the worker receives everything that is prom -
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ised, $1,559 a month is not very much to live on in retire-
ment.  Yet it may be all that the retiree has.
Typical workers, who earn an average of $33,200 a year
during their working years, will receive approximately 70
percent of their retirement income from Social Security. 3 
By contrast, if the same workers were able to invest their
Social Security taxes in bonds, a virtually risk-free in-
vestment, at retirement they would have accumulated enough
money to purchase annuities paying $2,671 a month.  If they
invested in a balanced portfolio, divided equally between
stocks and bonds, they could purchase annuities of $5,002 a
month.  And if they invested it all in stocks, they would be
able to purchase annuities paying an astounding $9,575 a
month.4
Or workers might choose to make programmed with drawals
from the accumulations in their accounts (more than $400,000
from a bond fund, more than $1.1 million from a stock fund).
 In that case, if a worker died before exhausting the
account funds, the worker's heirs would receive all of the
remaining money.
No matter which inve stment or retirement strategy was
chosen, both the workers and their families would be at a
greater advantage in the private system.
Breaking Barriers between Capital and Labor
An important side benefit of Social Security privatiza-
tion is that it would give working Americans an opportuni ty
to participate in the American economy by owning a part of
it.  In effect, privatizing Social Security would act as a
nationwide employee stock option plan that would enable even
the poorest workers to become capitalists.  Through Social
Security privatization, workers would become stockholders. 
The artificial and destructive division between labor and
capital would be broken down.
Americas have more economic and social mobility than do
the people of almost any other nation; Americans move both
up and down the social and economic ladder.  Most people who
are poor today are unlikely to be poor 10 years from now. 5 
However, when it comes to the accumula tion of wealth, work-
ers are at a distinct disadvantage.  For example, the bottom
50 percent of American income earners own just 2 percent of
the nation's financial wealth.  The top 1 percent owns more
than 56 percent of all net financial assets.  The financial
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wealth of the top 10 percent is 4,653 times greater than the
financial wealth of the bottom 20 percent. 6
One of the main reasons for that disparity is that many
workers are unable to take the surest route to wealth cre-
ation--savings and investment.  Approximately one-third of
all income in America comes, not from wages, but from sav-
ings and investment. 7  As Louis Kelso, father of the em ploy-
ee stock ownership plan, noted, "The bulk of wealth is
produced, not by human labor as under pre-industrial condi-
tions, but by capital instruments. . . . Capital and not
labor is the source of affluence in an industrial soci ety." 8
But most union wo rkers do not have the financial re-
sources to save and invest.  Clearly, imposing the Social
Security tax on workers reduces their private savings.
Workers are required by law to pay Social Security taxes.
That requirement precludes their investing their wages in
private savings or investments. 9   The payroll tax is the
largest tax most union workers pay.  Indeed, nearly 76
percent of Americans pay more in Social Security taxes than
they do in federal income taxes. 10 
The average union worker, earning $33,200 a year, will
pay $4,117 a year in Social Security taxes (including the
employer share).  That leaves very little money to invest
privately.  The inability to invest is borne out by the low
participation rates of low-income workers in compa ny-spon-
sored 401(k) plans.  Only 64 percent of low-wage work ers
contribute to the 401(k) plans offered by their employers,
compared with more than 90 percent of their higher wage
colleagues. 11  Low-wage workers who do participate contrib-
ute an average of only 4.73 percent of their wages, compared
with an average of 6.79 percent for high-wage workers. 12
Low-income workers are also less likely to work for
companies with private pension plans.  For example, small
businesses and service-sector employers are far less likely
to offer pensions and other retirement benefits than are
large corporations. 13
Finally, Social Security may be contributing to the
wealth gap even more by reducing the value of wages and
increasing the value of capital.  Because Social Security
reduces savings and capital accumulation, it reduces the
ratio of capital to workers, which means that each worker
will be less productive, on average.  As a result, wages are
lower than they would be otherwise.  At the same time, with
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less capital available, the return on capital may be higher
than it otherwise would be. 14
Privatizing Social Securi ty would enable low-wage
workers to participate in the wealth-creating mechanisms of
saving and investment.  If they had the opportunity to save
and invest 12.4 percent of their income--the amount now
taken by Social Security--low-wage workers would be able to
accumulate substantial nest eggs.
That sort of worker empowerment and opportunity for the
poor has brought many liberal Democrats to support the
privatization of Social Security.  As Sen. Robert Kerrey (D-
Neb.) has pointed out, privatizing Social Security is as
much about "generating wealth" as it is about the system's
financing.  Kerrey says that "every American [should have] a
chance to own part of his country." 15
Sam Beard, a former aide to Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-
Mass.), calls this process the "democratization of capital"
and points out that privatizing Social Security will give
every American a real stake in our economic future.  Beard
also notes that the benefits are psychological as well as
tangible, emphasizing that "personal participation will make
savings and economic education part of everyone's day-to-day
experience. . . . The benefits of this knowledge for indi-
viduals and families will include increased economic capa-
bility, a confident sense of the future, and more power to
make fundamental choices that effect their lives." 16
As a result of the enormous accumulation of wealth by
the working class through their retirement accounts, the
socialist dream of workers' owning the nation's businesses
and industries would be effectively achieved.  Since work ers
would own shares in the companies they worked for, they
could have a greater voice in corporate governance and
management decisions.
Overall, the distribution of wealth in the United
States would likely be more equal than it is today.  The
change in distribution would occur, not through the counter-
productive and illegitimate redistribution of existing
wealth, but through the creation of new wealth in workers'
retirement accounts.  In fact, Harvard economist Martin
Feldstein has estimated that if Social Security were privat-
ized, the concentration of wealth in America would be re-
duced by half. 17
As the division between labor and capi tal dissolved as
the nation's workers became capitalists, the social and
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political effects would be sharply increased support for
free-market economic policies.  Since workers would own part
of the nation's businesses, they would become more skeptical
of unnecessary tax burdens and regulatory market interfer-
ence that harm business performance.  Since workers would
own much of the nation's capital, they would oppose harsh
multiple taxation of capital gains.  General strife and
antagonism between labor and manage ment could be replaced by
cooperation, since workers would benefit directly from the
general prosperity of companies in which they shared owner-
ship.  As Alan Greenspan has explained, "[If workers] knew
what they owned in their retirement programs as distinct
from having a generic overall type of program, there [is] a
considerable amount of pride in that, and it has a very
important effect on people's citizenship in society." 18
Alternatives to Privatization Would Hurt Union Workers
Social Security is facing a severe financial shortfall.
 In fact, by 2013 Social Security will begin to run a defi-
cit--spending more on benefits than it collects in tax es. 19
 In the absence of privatization, Social Security will be
forced to raise taxes or cut benefits, options that would be
very painful for union members.  
Social Security has already raised payroll taxes 38
times since the program began, with serious consequences for
workers.  According to the Congressional Budget Office,
payroll tax increases between 1979 and 1982, for example,
resulted in the permanent loss of 500,000 jobs. 20  A study
of the 1988 and 1990 payroll tax hikes, by economists Gary
Robbins and Aldona Robbins, estimated permanent job losses
at approximately 510,000 and a reduction of the U.S. gross
national product of $30 billion per year by the year 2000. 21
Also important is the fact that the payroll tax is an
extremely regressive tax.  First, it is a tax on wages,
leaving other income sources, such as capital gains, inter-
est, and other profits on investment, untaxed.  Second,
because the amount of income subject to the tax is capped,
low-income workers pay a higher percentage of their income
in Social Security taxes than do high-income workers.  As a
result, the payroll tax is a tax aimed directly at union
workers.
Benefit cutbacks would also disproportionately affect
union workers.  For example, delaying retirement imposes
only a modest burden on many white-collar workers and manag-
ers, but can mean substantial hardship for many blue-collar
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workers and manual laborers.  Surveys have consistentlyshown
that white-collar workers are more likely to enjoy their
work and are more willing to work beyond age 65.
Therefore, by opposing privatization, union leaders may
be forcing Social Security reforms that will leave their
members at a great disadvantage.
Conclusion
Union workers would be among the people who would
benefit most from the privatiza tion of Social Security. 
They would receive far better retirement benefits under a
privatized system, would achieve greater participation in
the economy, would have the opportunity to accumulate real
wealth, and would avoid painful tax hikes or benefit cuts. 
Union leaders should abandon their ideological attachment to
Social Security and do what is best for their members--
support Social Security privatization.
Notes
1.   Samuel Gompers, "Not Even Compulsory Benevolence Will
Do," American Federationist  24 (January 1917): 48.
2.   Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Union Members Summary,"
Developments in Labor Management Relations , January 30,
1998.
3.   Niel Gilbert and Neung-Hoo Park, "Privatization, Provi-
sion, and Targeting: Trends and Policy Implications in the
United States," International Social Security Review  49
(January 1996): 22.
4.   Calculations assume a 4 percent rate of return on bonds
and a 7 percent rate of return on stocks.
5.   See, for example, Richard Burkhauser, Douglas Holtz-
Eakin, and Stephin Rhody, "Labor Earnings Mobility and In-
equality in the United States and Germany in the Growth
Years of the 1980's," accepted for publication in Interna-
tional Economic Review ; and W. Mi chael Cox and Rich ard Alm,
"By Our Own Bootstraps: Econom ic Oppor tunity and the Dynam-
ics of Income Distribution," Feder al Reserve Bank of Dallas,
1995.
6.   James Smith, "Unequal Wealth and Incentives to Save,"
RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1995.
Page 7
7.   "Remodeling Social Security," Economic Security 2000,
Washington, 1997.
8.   Quoted in Sam Beard, Restoring Hope in America: The
Social Security Solution  (San Francisco: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 1996), p. 160.
9.   Many economists also argue that Social Security benefits
reduce savings.  Since Social Security provides beneficia-
ries with retirement income, people think they have less
need to personally save for retirement.  Martin Feldstein,
"Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital
Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy  82, no. 5 (Sep-
tember-October 1974): 825-62; Martin Feld stein, "Inflation,
Tax Rules and Investment: Some Econo metric Evidence," Econo-
metrica  50, no. 4 (July 1982): 825-62; and Peter Diamond and
J. A. Hausman, "Individual Re tirement and Savings Behav ior,"
Journal of Public Economics  23, nos. 1-2 (February-March
1984): 81-114.
10.  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on ways and
Means, Background Materials on the Federal Budget and Tax
Policy for the Fiscal year 1991 and Beyond , Committee Print,
February 6, 1990, p. 30.
11.  Peter Elinsky and James Buckley, "Retirement Benefits in
the 1990's: 1997 Survey Data," KPMG Peat Marwick, 1997,
p. 32.
12.  Ibid., p. 34.
13.  Ibid., pp. 28-31.
14.  Martin Feldstein, "Social Insurance," Harvard Institute
of Economic Research Discus sion Paper no. 477, May 1976.
15.  Robert Kerrey, Speech to the National Press Club, Wash-
ington, September 17, 1997.
16.  Beard, p. 143.
17.  Martin Feldstein, "Social Security and the Distribution
of Wealth," Journal of the American Statistical Association ,
December 1976, pp. 90-93.
18.  Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the House Budget Com-
mittee, October 8, 1997.
Page 8
19.   Under intermediate assumptions.  See 1998 Annual Report
of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survi-
vors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds  (Wash-
ing ton: Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 28-30.
20.  Congressional Budget Office, "Aggregate Income Effects
of Changes in Social Security Taxes," August 1982, p. 30.
21.  Gary Robbins and Aldona Robbins, "Effects of the 1988
and 1990 Social Security Tax Increases," Institute for Re-
search on the Effects of Taxation, Washington, 1991,
pp. 14-15.
